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Feature #7031
closed
noexec_user_stack should be a security-flag
Start date:
2016-06-02
Due date:
% Done:
100%
Estimated time:
Difficulty:
Medium
Tags:
needs-triage
Gerrit CR:
External Bug:
Description
In addition to being tuned globally via the noexec_user_stack kernel global (which is retained for compatibility). The control of stack executability fits neatly as a per-process security-flags (see #7029) and should be implemented as one.
Related issues
Updated by Electric Monk almost 7 years ago
- Status changed from In Progress to Closed
- % Done changed from 70 to 100
git commit d2a70789f056fc6c9ce3ab047b52126d80b0e3da
commit d2a70789f056fc6c9ce3ab047b52126d80b0e3da
Author: Richard Lowe <richlowe@richlowe.net>
Date: 2016-10-15T16:02:16.000Z
7029 want per-process exploit mitigation features (secflags)
7030 want basic address space layout randomization (ASLR)
7031 noexec_user_stack should be a security-flag
7032 want a means to forbid mappings around NULL
Reviewed by: Robert Mustacchi <rm@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jeffpc@josefsipek.net>
Reviewed by: Patrick Mooney <pmooney@joyent.com>
Approved by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Updated by Joshua M. Clulow over 4 years ago
- Related to Feature #7029: want per-process exploit mitigation features (secflags) added
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